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This paper studies the relationship between competition and incentives in an economy with 
financial contracts. We concentrate on non-exclusive credit relationships, those where an 
entrepreneur can simultaneously accept more than one contractual offer. Several 
homogeneous lenders compete on the contracts they offer to finance the entrepreneur's 
investment project. We model a common agency game with moral hazard, and we 
characterize its equilibria. As expected, notwithstanding the competition among the 
principals (lenders), non-competitive outcomes can be supported. In particular, positive 
profit equilibria are pervasive. We then provide a complete welfare analysis and show that 
all equilibrium allocations turn out to be constrained Pareto efficient.  
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The paper is devoted to the analysis of credit markets where several lenders strategi-
cally compete over the contracts they oﬀer to entrepreneur-borrowers. At the stage of
contracting, the decision of the unique borrower crucially depends on the loans she is si-
multaneously receiving from all the lenders of the economy. We consider a set-up where
the contracts are non-exclusive, i.e. the borrower is allowed to accept more than one
contract at a time. The main aim of the work is to emphasize the interplay of contrac-
tual externalities in determining the welfare properties of the equilibria arising in such
framework.
Examples of ﬁnancial interactions with non-exclusive contracting which aim at clarify-
ing the relationship between incentives and competition are very recent: the main general
results and implications are discussed by Segal & Whinston (2003).
The relevant ﬁnding of the literature on non-exclusivity can be summarized as follows:
the contractual externalities emerging when several principals interact with one common
agent, can be responsible for existence of second-best ineﬃcient equilibria. In other words,
a social planner who is subject to incentive constraints and feasibility can achieve outcomes
that Pareto dominate the equilibrium outcomes of players’ interactions.
Constrained ineﬃcient equilibria have mostly been analyzed in insurance set-ups (Arnott
& Stiglitz (1993), Hellwig (1983), Kahn & Mookherjee (1998) and Bisin & Guaitoli (2004)).
The present essay proposes an investigation on the welfare properties of equilibria in the
credit market, where strategic competition is over ﬁnancial contracts.
The theoretical contributions examining credit market imperfections mostly use the
principal-agent model as a tool to represent credit relationships. The solution to a standard
principal-agent program is equivalent to the outcome of a planner’s maximization problem
under exclusive contracting and subject to the same asymmetry of information, given
appropriate welfare weights.
Exclusivity clauses are not explicitly imposed, though, in several ﬁnancial relationships.
It is recognized that many ﬁrms have access to multiple credit sources, as shown by
Petersen & Rajan (1995) for the small ﬁrms in the U.S., or by Detragiache et al. (2000) for
the Italian case. The credit card market has been proposed as an example of non-exclusive
dealings, as Bizer & DeMarzo (1992) and Parlour & Rajan (2001) have already explained.
Hence, enriching the analysis of competition in the credit market using the common agency
approach to ﬁnancial contracting, we believe is a necessary step to analyze competition on
ﬁnancial markets and the welfare properties of the equilibria of the corresponding game.
This work could then be regarded as part of a research project on welfare foundations for
policy intervention, in particular along the lines of the credit channel of monetary policy.1
1The credit view of monetary policy relates the eﬀects of a monetary intervention to the diﬃculties
for borrowers to access the credit market. Fundamental imperfections in credit relationships, mainly
due to asymmetric information problems, constitute the main channel for monetary transmission. Many
have been the contributions to the theoretical assessment of this transmission mechanism (see Besanko &
Kanatas (1993), Bolton & Freixas (2000), Holmstrom & Tirole (1997) and Repullo & Suarez (2000)). The
standard models of the credit channel assume perfect competition among investors in the ﬁnancial market;
thus, they restrict the analysis to zero-proﬁt equilibria for lenders in an economy subject to asymmetric
1We propose a simple, static and partial equilibrium model of the credit market to
study multiple credit relationships. We model competition between an arbitrarily large
and ﬁnite number of lenders who oﬀer credit lines to a single borrower. The borrower has
to take some non-observable action; she can choose not to perform the hidden action and
to divert resources for private use, in which case she will appropriate a ﬁxed proportion
of the received liquidity.2 By exerting eﬀort in the investment project, she will get some
stochastic returns from the production technology. None of the lender is irrelevant, in the
sense that every proposed loan aﬀects the entrepreneur on the eﬀort she will choose.
The possibility to sign several contracts simultaneously generates externalities among
the ﬁnanciers. These externalities are responsible for the emergence of equilibrium results
which are not in line with Bertrand theory of competition. If the agency costs are high
enough, competition among ﬁnanciers delivers non-competitive results in the forms of
credit rationing and of positive extra-proﬁts at equilibrium.
The model is closely related to the Parlour & Rajan (2001)’s work on the credit cards
market, which we regard as a useful benchmark to provide insights on the emergence of
positive proﬁt equilibria. We modiﬁed their analysis, generalizing their incentive structure.
As a result, we are able to provide the same equilibrium characterization as Parlour &
Rajan (2001) in a richer set-up.
The main contribution of this work relies, though, on the welfare analysis of the credit
market equilibria. Examining this issue, we show that every positive-proﬁt equilibrium
is constrained Pareto eﬃcient, i.e. it would be the outcome of the decision of a central
authority subject to the same informational constraints. The result is not in line with
the main ﬁndings of the existing literature on competition and incentives, which has
always emphasized that non-exclusive contracting generates those externalities sustaining
constrained ineﬃcient outcomes.3
Our simple example clariﬁes how could the incentive structure eliminate the (con-
strained) ineﬃciency result. The crucial element turns out to be the existence of a bind-
ing Incentive Compatibility constraint in every credit market equilibrium. This guarantees
that all equilibrium outcomes can in fact be obtained as the solution of a planner’s prob-
lem. In particular, the feasible sets of the two problems result to be the same.
Surprisingly, the same argument applies to the recent literature on insurance mar-
kets with non-exclusive contracting. Relaxing the assumption of risk-averse agents in the
framework of Bisin & Guaitoli (2004) and Kahn & Mookherjee (1998) implies that their
positive proﬁts equilibria (which were the ineﬃcient ones) would feature binding incentive
constraints and, as a consequence, collapse to allocations on the second-best frontier.
information. In the optimal contracting problems, this is summarized in a binding Individual Rationality
constraint for the (single) ﬁnancier. Now, if lenders compete on the loan contracts they oﬀer to borrowers,
then they could strategically exploit each others presence and positive-proﬁt equilibria may appear. The
existence of a credit channel of monetary policy in such a context has not been analyzed in the literature,
so far.
2This model is indeed compatible with the literature on strategic default. For a detailed justiﬁcation
of such an approach to strategic default, refer to Parlour & Rajan (2001).
3See Arnott & Stiglitz (1993), Kahn & Mookherjee (1998), Bisin & Guaitoli (2004), Segal & Whinston
(2003).
2The discussion is organized in the following way: Section 2 presents the features of
our set-up. Section 3 characterizes the credit market equilibria of a simpliﬁed version of
the model. Section 4 provides the welfare analysis and the results on the eﬃciency of the
positive-proﬁt equilibria as compared to those obtained in the insurance set-ups. Section
5 presents a discussion of our results in the light of the existing literature on competitive
insurance markets under moral hazard. The Appendix presents the general version of our
credit economy and contains all the proofs.
2 The model
Credit relationships are represented in a simple way. In this economy there are N ≥ 2
lenders (indexed by i ∈ N = {1,2,...,N}) who compete over the loan contracts to ﬁnance
a single borrower.4 The entrepreneur is penniless though she has access to the technology
for the production of the only existing good. Contractual oﬀers are simultaneous. Having
received all the contract’s proposals, the borrower decides which of them to sign taking
into account that she can accept any subset of them.5
The production process is stochastic and the probability distribution over the random
outcomes is determined by the entrepreneur’s choice on a non-contractible action (eﬀort).
The entrepreneur’s eﬀort space is made of two elements: eH and eL, with eH > eL. If
the high eﬀort eH is chosen, production successfully yields G(I) for every I invested with
probability p and 0 with probability 1 − p. If, on the contrary, the low eﬀort eL is taken,
the entrepreneur’s activity is unsuccessful with probability 1.
Exerting eﬀort implies some disutility for the borrower. We chose to represent this
feature using a private beneﬁt function ψ(e), which takes values ψ(eH) = 0 and ψ(eL) =
B(I). The private beneﬁt function B(I) is assumed continuous, increasing and convex
and such to satisfy the Inada conditions. For the discussion that follows, we adopt a linear
version of the private beneﬁt function, i.e. B(I) = BI.6
In other words, we are considering the set of outcomes Y = {G(I),0}. The private
choice of eﬀort aﬀects the probability distribution of these realizations. In particular, if the
entrepreneur exerts high eﬀort eH, the probability vector is given by the array: {p,1 − p}
with p > 0. If instead the entrepreneur shirks, i.e. chooses low eﬀort eL, the lottery is
degenerate and equal to {0,1}. The production function G(I) is continuous, increasing
and strictly concave in I. Inada conditions are also satisﬁed.
Let us describe the normal form of the game we are considering. Lenders strategically
compete over ﬁnancial contracts. The strategy of each lender i is the choice of the contract
Ci. The contract oﬀer Ci prescribes a repayment line Ri and a loan amount Ii, i.e.
Ci = (Ri,Ii) ∈ Ci ⊆
R2
+
4Abusing notation we indicate the set of lenders and its cardinality with N.
5This deﬁnes a scenario of delegated common agency Martimort & Stole (2003)
6This is without loss of generality and keeps the problem simple. In the Appendix we consider the more
general version of the model.
3where Ci is the set of feasible contract oﬀers for each lender i. We also denote C = iCi
the aggregate set of oﬀered contracts.7 The borrower’s strategy is therefore given by the
map:
sb : C → {0,1}N  
eH,eL 
With a small abuse of notation, we also deﬁne the generic element of the set {0,1}N as








b = {0,1} is the borrower’s decision of rejecting or




i ∈ N : ai
b = 1
 
In other words, the borrower decides on the choice of the eﬀort level and on the relevant
set of oﬀers to accept. Her strategy set will be denoted as Sb, so that sb ∈ Sb.
Let us now consider the payoﬀs of this game. The borrower’s payoﬀ is given by:
πb =
 
p[G(I) − R] if eH is chosen
BI if eL is chosen








Lender i’s payoﬀ is given by:
πi =
 
pRi − (1 + r)Ii if Ci is accepted
0 otherwise,
and r ∈
R + is the lender’s cost of collecting deposits.8
Observe that lender i’s payoﬀ does not directly depend on lender j’s strategies. Exis-
tence of contractual externalities among lenders is originated by the borrower’s behavior
only: at the stage of contracting with lender i, the action chosen by the borrower also
depends on the contractual oﬀer she is receiving from each lender j  = i.9
The borrower is subject to limited liability. If the low eﬀort is chosen, she will have no
appropriable resources to repay the loan. In particular each lender i will earn a negative
pay-oﬀ of:
7One should notice that lenders’ strategy are take-it or leave-it oﬀers. When common agency games of
complete information are considered, this restriction on principals’ strategy spaces involves a loss of gener-
ality. If principals are allowed to oﬀer menus over the relevant alternatives, there can emerge equilibrium
outcomes that could not be supported by simple oﬀers (see Peters (2001) and Martimort & Stole (2002)).
There is, anyway, always a rationale for the use of take-it or leave-it oﬀers: Peters (2003) shows that every
equilibrium outcome of this simple game continues to be an equilibrium outcome of the extended game
where principals are competing over menus.
8Lenders here rely on the deposit market to ﬁnance entrepreneurial activity.
9This is usually referred to as the absence of direct externalities among principals. Most common
agency models have been developed in such a simpliﬁed scenario. Examples of recent researches where
direct externalities among principals are considered include Bernheim & Whinston (1998) and Martimort
& Stole (2003).
4πi = −(1 + r)Ii.
The only way to give the ﬁnancier a positive repayment will hence be to induce the
high eﬀort choice. We model credit market interactions as a sequential game, with a ﬁrst
stage where several lenders play a simultaneous move game and a second stage where the
borrower decides on acceptance/rejection of each oﬀer and ﬁnally exerts eﬀort. In formal
terms, loan relationships are represented by the following complete information common
agency game Γ:
Γ = {(πi)i∈N,πb,C,Sb}.
3 Credit market equilibria
This section discusses the properties of the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria of the game Γ.
The equilibria match those discussed by Parlour & Rajan (2001). However, we are able
to show that the speciﬁc characterization obtained in Parlour & Rajan (2001) can in fact
be reproduced in a more general setting, where the private beneﬁt earned by the single
agent is taken to be a non-linear function of the amount borrowed I.
The discussion of this general case is left to the Appendix (that contains all the proofs),
while in the following sections we present the simpler case with B(I) = BI, with B > 0.
This scenario indeed simply reformulates the original Parlour & Rajan (2001) model in a
moral hazard setting and introduces a positive interest rate on deposits.
Having presented the equilibria of the credit market we will characterize the constrained
Pareto frontier of the economy, and show that competition among lenders sustains only
second-best eﬃcient allocations (equilibria). We start by remarking that whenever the
eﬀort eL is chosen, every active lender earns negative proﬁts. As a consequence, at equi-
librium only the high level of eﬀort will be implemented.
Furthermore, since the entrepreneur’s private beneﬁt is monotonically increasing in
the aggregate lending I, the borrower will always have the incentive to accept the whole
array of oﬀered contracts when selecting eL. This greatly simpliﬁes the incentive analysis.
We consider Subgame Perfection as the relevant equilibrium concept for the game Γ.
Deﬁnition 1 A (pure strategy) Subgame Perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the game Γ is an
array
  







ˆ the borrower is optimally choosing the set of accepted contracts A(i.e. she is selecting
her optimal array ab ∈ {0,1}N ) and implementing the high level of eﬀort;
ˆ for every lender i ∈ N, the pair
 
˜ Ri, ˜ Ii
 
is a solution to the following problem:
max
Ri,Ii





































The inequality (IC) is the borrower’s Incentive Compatibility constraint and it is for-
mulated in terms of aggregate investment and aggregate revenues. The borrower has no
endowment in this game, her exogenous reservation utility is thus zero. Hence, the con-
straint (IC) (together with limited liability conditions) deﬁnes the set of feasible contracts
under non-exclusivity for each lender i.










pG(I) − (1 + r)I,
where I∗ is such that pG′ (I∗) = 1+r and that the corresponding surplus is positive.10
We characterize equilibrium allocations in terms of the incentive parameter B. As
a starting point, we introduce the threshold value Bz, which deﬁnes the lowest level of
incentives compatible with the ﬁrst-best level of investment:
Bz =
pG(I∗) − (1 + r)I∗
I∗.
(1)
Figure 1 identiﬁes Bz using the total surplus hump-shaped curve, S = pG(I)−(1+r)I,
and straight lines starting from the origin with slope equal to B. Equation (1) implies
that Bz is the slope of the ray that cuts the surplus’ curve at its maximum.
If B = Bz, then for the ﬁrst-best investment I∗ to be feasible, the (IC) constraint
must bind. From equation (1) it follows that in every economy where B = Bz, whenever
I∗ is implemented, the borrower gets the entire surplus. Lenders’ proﬁts are equal to zero
and the corresponding aggregate repayment will be R∗ such that pR∗ − (1 + r)I∗ = 0.11
Whenever B > Bz allocations giving zero-proﬁts to the lenders are feasible only if the
level of debt is taken to be lower than I∗.12 We denote ¯ I(B) the constrained-maximum





− (1 + r)¯ I(B) = B¯ I(B),
and ¯ I(B) < I∗ holds. Finally, whenever B < Bz, it is possible to achieve I∗ and
to leave some extra-surplus to lenders. One should also notice that for every B < Bz
10Inada conditions guarantee the existence of such an I
∗.
11Of course, this implies that every lender earns zero proﬁt, given that their condition is symmetric and
limited liability holds.
12That is, the ﬁrst-best investment level I





pG(I) − (1 + r)I
Figure 1: Graphical representation of Bz
it would be feasible to implement the ﬁrst best level of investment I∗ in a monopolistic
environment.
3.1 Characterization
In a scenario where credit relationships take place under the assumption of exclusive
contracting, the borrower can only accept at most one contract at a time. If lenders
compete ` a la Bertrand over contracts, at equilibrium the borrower will appropriate the
whole surplus and they will always receive zero proﬁts.13 Notice that competition under
exclusivity delivers the ﬁrst-best level of credit I∗ only for those economies where the
incentive problems are very mild (B < Bz). If the incentive to shirk is high enough, say
B ≥ Bz, then zero-proﬁt equilibria will be associated to the constrained amount of credit
¯ I(B).
If we allow for non-exclusive contracting, then we formally enter into a common agency
set-up. Given the high degree of externalities involved in the analysis, positive proﬁts
equilibria and low levels of aggregate investment will be a typical feature of the analysis.
In our model, we can sustain zero-proﬁt equilibria with competition among lenders oﬀering
non-exclusive contracts for those parameter values which make the moral hazard problem
very mild. As will be clear from the following discussion, equilibria exhibit diﬀerent
features according to the magnitude of the parameter B relative to the level Bz. To
provide a full description of equilibrium outcomes it is useful to introduce the threshold:
13The mechanism of undercutting on each opponent’s proposal squeezes any possible rent for the lenders.
There cannot be an equilibrium with positive proﬁts for the lenders, given they are all identical and the
entrepreneur chooses only one proposal.
7Bc =
pG(I∗) − I∗(1 + r)
2I∗ ,
which is lower that Bz and in particular it holds 2Bc = Bz. From the deﬁnition of Bc,
we can argue that whenever B < Bc < Bz and there are at least two lenders oﬀering the
zero-proﬁt contract (R∗,I∗), then I∗ can be sustained also in the presence of two lenders.






pG(I) − BI − (1 + r)I,
and denote Bl the threshold level of incentive such that:
Bl =
pG(Im) − Im(1 + r)
I∗ + Im
.
Then, for every B < Bl < Bz it is feasible to implement the monopolistic outcome
even if the supplementary amount I∗ was oﬀered.
We are now ready to provide a simple characterization of equilibria in terms of the
incentive parameter B.
Considering those situations where incentive problems are very mild, we can state the
following:
Proposition 1 Whenever B ≤ Bz, then the outcome (R∗,I∗) can be supported as a (pure
strategy) equilibrium of the game Γ. In particular:
i) If B ≤ Bc, then (R∗,I∗) is an equilibrium outcome for any N.
ii) If B ∈ (Bc,Bz], then there exists a critical number of lenders NB such that for all
N > NB the aggregate allocation (R∗,I∗) is an equilibrium outcome.
iii) For every B ∈ (Bc,Bl], there exists an equilibrium where only one contract is bought.
The contract guarantees positive proﬁts to the unique active lender. Furthermore,
there is a second lender who oﬀers a zero-proﬁt contract that is not accepted. All
other lenders are not active.
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.
The intuition for the result (i) is the following: consider a scenario where (N − 2)
lenders are not active, while each of the remaining two can oﬀer a contract associated to
a level of debt equal to I∗. Notice that by deﬁnition, 2Bc = Bz: this guarantees that two
lenders are enough to sustain the zero-proﬁt equilibrium. If B = Bc, then the borrower
is indiﬀerent between accepting any of the two contracts exerting the desired high eﬀort,
and accepting both of them taking low eﬀort. As long as any single lender k = i,j oﬀers a




p ,Ik  = I∗
 
, a Bertrand argument
applies: the two-lenders competition generates undercutting on each other’s oﬀer until the
marginal cost of funds meets the marginal revenue.
One should note that the competitive result emerging in a scenario of exclusivity can
hence be implemented even without imposing exclusivity clauses. If the incentive to shirk
8is low, then, despite the high amount of externalities associated to competition under
non-exclusivity, the ﬁrst best outcome can still be reached.
If the incentive to take the low action falls between Bc and Bz, then zero-proﬁts
equilibria may arise only if N is large enough. This is stated in (ii); in this case, there is
no room for a single lender to oﬀer the contract (R∗,I∗) and trigger the low eﬀort choice.
The borrower will always have an incentive to accept it in conjunction with other zero
proﬁt contracts and shirk. We hence consider a scenario where all lenders oﬀer the contract
(Ri,Ii), where Ii = I∗
N−1 and Ri is the repayment level that guarantees zero-proﬁts to the
i-th lender when oﬀering the loan amount I∗
N−1, i.e. Ri =
I∗(1+r)
(N−1)p. The borrower accepts
(N − 1) oﬀers and selects e = eH. All active lenders enjoy zero proﬁts, but they cannot
have an incentive to deviate given the existence of the inactive one. It is then possible
to ﬁnd a level of N high enough such that this last lender could not proﬁtably deviate
without inducing low eﬀort.
Finally, (iii) identiﬁes a situation where positive proﬁt may emerge even though the
incentive to take low action is relatively small. In such a case, the ﬁrst-best level of
investment I∗ will be achieved but the distribution of the total surplus will be rather
favorable to the lenders. The equilibrium is sustained by latent contracts, i.e. contracts
which are not bought at equilibrium and are used to deter entry. The analysis of these
sort of equilibria has been ﬁrst introduced by Hellwig (1983) and Arnott & Stiglitz (1993),
and then developed by Bisin & Guaitoli (2004).
If we consider the case B > Bz, then positive proﬁts equilibria are a general feature of
the analysis. Let us ﬁrst observe that:
Lemma 1 When B > Bz, at every (pure strategy) equilibrium of the game Γ the IC
constraint binds.
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.
When the incentive to take the low action is low enough, say B ≤ Bz, then lenders will
eﬀectively compete ` a la Bertrand, and the IC constraint will bind at the ﬁrst best level
I∗. The previous Lemma emphasizes that the existence of a binding incentive constraint
will be a general feature of our economy, independently of the distribution of surplus.14
The following proposition provides a full characterization of equilibria in this region.
Proposition 2 If B ≥ Bz, then no allocation guaranteeing zero-proﬁt for lenders can be
sustained at equilibrium. In addition,
iv) If B ∈ [Bz,Bm), there is a critical number of lenders NB such that for every
N ≥ NB, there exists a positive proﬁt equilibrium. The equilibrium outcome
 
N ˜ R,N ˜ I
 
is













(N − 1)˜ I
 









− N ˜ R
 
= BN ˜ I (3)
14Importantly, this result has not been stressed by Parlour & Rajan (2001).
9and exhibits the feature that:
(N − 1)˜ I > Im (4)
v) If B ≥ Bm, then the monopoly outcome can be supported at equilibrium for any N.
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.
If the incentive problem is relevant, given the concavity of the G(.) function, then any
equiproportional reduction in both the repayment and the credit oﬀered by a single ﬁrm
satisﬁes the IC constraint as a strict inequality. Hence, there is room for a proﬁtable
deviation to break any zero-proﬁt equilibrium.
One should also notice that (iv) refers to an equilibrium where all the N existing lenders
are active and the borrower is indiﬀerent between accepting (N −1) or N contracts while
exerting high eﬀort, as shown by (2). This no-side-contracting condition is crucial to
establish existence of equilibria with positive proﬁts in several works on moral hazard in
insurance economies because it prevents additional purchases of insurance.15 When the
borrower accepts N contracts, her Incentive Compatibility constraint (3) binds. Finally,
the aggregate level of credit issued by (N − 1) lenders is strictly greater than Im that
corresponds to the investment chosen by one monopolistic lender (4). At equilibrium, every
lender is active in the market, though the aggregate investment level turns out to be strictly
lower than I∗. Competition over ﬁnancial contracts and moral hazard determine rationing
in credit supply and redistribution towards the ﬁnancial sector. Whenever B > Bz, we
are in the increasing part of the social surplus function S = pG(I)−(1+r)I represented
in Fig. 1. As a consequence, a single lender i oﬀering a zero-proﬁt contract can proﬁtably
deviate if all the others are playing a zero-proﬁt strategy: a Bertrand outcome cannot be
sustained.
When the moral hazard problem is very relevant, say B ≥ Bm, then any credit level
diﬀerent from the monopoly one induces shirking, as stated in part (v) of Proposition 2.
The main concern of this paper is to characterize the welfare properties of credit market
equilibria when multiple lenders compete over loan contracts. This analysis is developed
in the next section.
4 Welfare analysis
We provide here a description of the economy’s feasible set, that is of the set of players’
payoﬀs corresponding to the allocations implementable by a (benevolent) social planner.
We introduce the notion of social planner and the related concept of constrained eﬃciency
in the same way as it is done in the literature on incentives in competitive markets (see for
instance Bisin & Guaitoli (2004)), but we manage to characterize the whole constrained
15See again Bisin & Guaitoli (2004) and Kahn & Mookherjee (1998).
10Pareto frontier. The social planner will choose the aggregate investment level I and the
aggregate repayment R to maximize his preference relation over the aggregate feasible set
that is usually named the utility possibility set.
We will henceforth denote πL the payoﬀ earned by the lenders in the aggregate credit
sector and πb the corresponding borrower’s payoﬀ. Let us start considering the ﬁrst-
best situation, where the relevant constraints faced by the planner are those imposed by
technology and resources (together with limited liability requirements). The corresponding












pG(I∗) − (1 + r)I∗
Figure 2: The ﬁrst-best Pareto frontier
The frontier of the set F is referred to as the ﬁrst-best Pareto frontier. All the arrays




L ≥ πL and π′
b > πb or π′
L > πL and π′
b ≥ πb.
Observe that the payoﬀs functions πL(R,I) and πb(R,I) evaluated at the high level
of eﬀort are both linear in the aggregate repayment R. As a consequence, the ﬁrst-best
Pareto frontier will be a downward-sloping 45-degree line. By using the variable pR as a
transfer, we can draw the ﬁrst-best Pareto frontier π∗
L(π∗
b) as the line depicted in Figure 2.
Every point on the ﬁrst-best Pareto frontier corresponds to the optimal investment
level I∗. In particular, point A identiﬁes a situation where the whole surplus is distributed
to the borrower, π∗
b = pG(I∗) − (1 + r)I∗, so that pR = (1 + r)I∗, i.e. π∗
L = 0. If we
consider the opposite case π∗
b = 0, then from (5) we get pR = pG(I∗), i.e. lenders are
receiving everything and the borrower is left at her reservation utility of zero (point A′).
The second-best allocations are those implementable by a planner who is facing infor-
mational as well as feasibility constraints. The constrained utility possibility set is the set





+ : πL ≤ π∗∗
L (π∗∗
b ,B), πb ≤ π∗∗
b ∀ π∗∗
b ∈ [0,pG(I∗) − I∗(1 + r)]
 
where for every given π∗∗
b , π∗∗
L (π∗∗
b ,B) is such that:
π∗∗
L (π∗∗
b ,B) = max
R,I
pR − (1 + r)I (6)
s.t.
pR − (1 + r)I + π∗∗
b ≤ pG(I) − (1 + r)I (7)
π∗∗
b ≥ BI (8)
With respect to the ﬁrst-best problem, we have introduced here the Incentive Compat-
ibility requirement appearing in equation (8). Observe that for a given π∗∗
b , the lender’s
objective function is monotone in R, hence equation (7) will bind at the optimum. We
can therefore substitute the expression for pR obtained in (7), in the objective function.
The system (6)-(8) can be rewritten as:
π∗∗
L (π∗∗
b ,B) = max
I
pG(I) − π∗∗
b − (1 + r)I (9)
s.t.
π∗∗
b ≥ BI (10)
One should notice that the constrained utility possibility set and the second-best Pareto
frontier are parameterized to the given incentive structure B. Recall that we deﬁned Bz
as the level of the incentive parameter such that:
pG(I∗) − (1 + r)I∗ = BzI∗
implying that pR∗ = (1 + r)I∗, i.e. lenders make zero proﬁts. Hence,
∀B < Bz pG(I∗) − (1 + r)I∗ < BI∗
That is, constraint (10) is slack and the ﬁrst-best is feasible in the second-best problem.
In particular, the point (π∗∗
b ,π∗∗
L ) = (pG(I∗) − (1 + r)I∗,0) belongs to the second-best
Pareto frontier (point A in Figure 3). Hence, given that B is strictly lower than Bz,
there is room to reduce π∗∗
b without making the constraint (10) binding. There will
therefore be an interval of entrepreneur’s utilities, i.e. π∗∗
b ∈ [BI∗,pG(I∗) − I∗(1 + r)],
such that the second-best Pareto frontier π∗∗
L (π∗∗
b ,B) coincides with the ﬁrst-best one
π∗
L(π∗
b) (Figure 3). By reducing the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ we get to π∗∗
b = BI∗ and
π∗∗
L = pG(I∗) − I∗(1 + r) − BI∗. Every further reduction in π∗∗
b will imply a decrease in
the investment level.





Figure 3: The ﬁrst and second-best Pareto frontiers for B < Bz
If we consider the case B > Bz, then equation (10) will always be binding at the
optimum level of investment, hence it will not be possible to sustain the ﬁrst-best invest-
ment level I∗. As a consequence, for every B greater than Bz the second-best frontier
π∗∗
L (π∗∗
b ,B) will always lie below the ﬁrst-best one, as it is depicted in Figure 4.
For the cases of relatively mild incentive problem the second-best frontier has therefore
a linear part, that corresponds to the implementation of the ﬁrst-best level of investment
(Figure 3); whenever the moral hazard becomes harsher, then the frontier contracts in-
wards (Figure 4).
No matter the value of B, the highest possible payoﬀ for the lending sector corresponds
to the monopolistic allocation, when the entrepreneur is squeezed to a payoﬀ of π∗∗
b = BIm
and the lenders appropriate all the rest.16 Whenever π∗∗
b < BIm every reduction in π∗∗
b
calls for a reduction in π∗∗
L . In the limit the only way to set π∗∗
b = 0 is to ﬁx an investment
level equal to zero, so that there will not be anything left for the lenders, either. Finally,
we argue that the concavity of G(I) induces a concavity in the second-best Pareto frontier
(Figure 3 and Figure 4).
16Recall that every monopolistic investment depends on the value of the incentive parameter, hence it








pG(I∗) − (1 + r)I∗
Figure 4: The second-best Pareto frontier for B > Bz
Lemma 2 Take any B, for every π∗∗
b ≤ BI∗ the frontier π∗∗
L (π∗∗
b ,B) is a concave curve.
In particular, π∗∗
L (π∗∗
b ,B) has a maximum in π∗∗
b = BIm. For every π∗∗




Proof. If (10) is not binding, we are back to the linear part of the frontier, which is
trivially concave. The interesting case is that of a binding IC constraint (10). Given π∗∗
b




. As a consequence, we get:
π∗∗
L (π∗∗










(1 + r) − π∗∗
b
that is a strictly concave function of π∗∗
b . In particular, for B > Bz the second-best Pareto
frontier is strictly concave.
Deﬁning the constrained Pareto frontier of the economy gives us more intuitions about
the welfare implications of competition over loan contracts. The existence of positive
proﬁt equilibria and some form of rationing in credit markets, where an arbitrarily large
number of homogeneous lenders is competing, turn out to be the by-products of the
competitive process under asymmetric information. In such circumstances, we ﬁnd that
a planner facing the same informational constraints as the lenders, cannot implement
Pareto-dominant allocations with respect to the equilibrium outcomes of the strategic
interactions between N lenders and a single borrower.
Let us examine the equilibria of the credit market. The equilibria characterized in
Proposition 1 involve either a competitive outcome where lenders earn zero-proﬁt (parts
i and ii ) or the existence of some latent contracts sustaining positive-proﬁt for the active
ﬁnancier (part iii ). It is quite intuitive that the competitive equilibria in i) and ii) lie on
14the linear part of the frontier, in fact they correspond to point A in Figure 3. The equilibria
with positive proﬁts and latent contracts in iii) fall in the region B < Bz. There, it is
always possible to sustain the ﬁrst-best level of investment I∗ together with π∗∗
b > BI∗.
The equilibrium level of investment would be the same that a social planner would choose
when solving (9)-(10) with a slack incentive compatibility constraint. Hence, the latent
contracts are just a device for a diﬀerent sharing of the surplus among the contractual
parties. These equilibrium allocations would correspond to points on the linear part of
the second-best Pareto frontier π∗∗
L (π∗∗
b ,B) as depicted in Figure 3.
The equilibria described in Proposition 2 satisfy the same property. Their crucial
feature turns out to be that the IC constraint is satisﬁed as an equality. As a consequence,
to every payoﬀ earned by the entrepreneur/borrower will correspond the same level of
credit issuance, both at equilibrium and at the optimum. As a consequence, the payoﬀ
earned by the lending sector will also be the same:17
Proposition 3 Consider B ≤ Bz, all equilibria deﬁned in Proposition 1 are eﬃcient, and
the optimal level of investment I∗ is implemented.
Take a B > Bz and consider the allocations of the positive-proﬁts equilibria deﬁned in
Proposition 2, they all belong to the constrained Pareto frontier π∗∗
L (π∗∗
b ,B).
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.
The main result can hence be summarized as follows: the common agency interactions
in the market for loans deliver constrained Pareto eﬃcient equilibria, despite the external-
ities due to strategic competition over ﬁnancial contracts. The next section investigates
in detail the sources of this ﬁnding.
5 Discussion and conclusions
We proposed a simple characterization of the constrained Pareto frontier. At the opti-
mum, either the ﬁrst best outcome is implemented, or the Incentive Compatibility (IC)
constraint binds as an equality.
The equilibrium outcomes described in Proposition 1 are such that the investment level
I∗ is achieved, whereas those characterized in Proposition 2 imply a binding IC constraint.
This is the key to understand the eﬃciency result: whenever the IC constraint binds, there
is a one-to-one relationship between the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ and the amount of credit
issued at equilibrium (and at the optimum). This determines aggregate loan supply,
and hence the social surplus. The overall payoﬀ for lenders is determined residually. In
particular, the no-side-contracting condition (4) only serves as a redistributive rule within
the lending sector.
In our context, whenever the IC constraint is not binding, there is always room for an
additional lender to oﬀer a proﬁtable contract that will be accepted without inducing the
borrower to switch to the low eﬀort.
17See Proposition 6 in the Appendix for the generalization of this result to the case of a non-linear B(I)
function.
15This intuition provides useful insights for further discussion on the literature on com-
petitive markets under asymmetric information. In particular, we can relate our ﬁndings
to the studies on competition in insurance and ﬁnancial markets: Arnott & Stiglitz (1993),
Hellwig (1983), Bizer & DeMarzo (1992), Kahn & Mookherjee (1998), Bisin & Guaitoli
(2004) among others. These researches emphasized how asymmetric information in non-
exclusive markets may give rise to the so-called ”non-price equilibria”, that typically fail
to be (constrained) Pareto eﬃcient. If one modiﬁes the basic description of the economy
so to get a binding Incentive Compatibility constraint at equilibrium, then eﬃciency can
be reestablished.
Take as an example the recent work of Bisin & Guaitoli (2004), where the ineﬃcient
equilibria are those supported by latent policies. In their framework, as in all the liter-
ature dealing with insurance problems, the agent is typically risk-averse with respect to
the event of an accident. Introducing a risk-neutral agent eliminates the extra-premium
for misbehaving, hence it reduces the (endogenous) reservation utility of the low eﬀort
at equilibrium and leads to a binding IC constraint. It is then possible to verify that
all the equilibria of their insurance model have the same eﬃciency properties, i.e. they
induce second-best eﬃcient outcomes.18 Hence, introducing risk neutrality is a means
to recover a binding IC constraint. Even though risk aversion is a natural assumption
in insurance set-ups, most of the banking literature typically considers risk-neutral en-
trepreneurs/borrowers.19
Our investigation, then, contributes to improve the understanding of the welfare prop-
erties of strategic competition among intermediaries in the presence of a single agent.
Intuition seems to suggest that whenever common agency games with complete informa-
tion are considered, then eﬃcient outcomes can be supported at equilibrium as long as
the IC constraint binds.20 The eﬀect of externalities from competition pass through the
incentive structure, hence if it was sensitive and reactive enough, we could identify the
eﬀects of competition on contracts. A related research along this line explores the possi-
bility to enrich the contractual mechanism so to have several dimensions to measure the
competition. It is shown that if the ﬁnancial contracts includes some monitoring activ-
ity, together with loan amount and repayment, then the constrained ineﬃciency result
emerges.21 Having a richer contractual mechanism is another way to sustain non-binding
Incentive Compatibility constraint.
Finally, it is important to remark that our analysis is focused on the simple scenario
where lenders’ strategies are restricted to be take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers. Investigating the
welfare implications of competition through more complex mechanisms is still a very open
18With reference to Bisin & Guaitoli (2004), if a risk-neutral agent is considered, then their equation
(7) coincides with our IC constraint. In addition, examining equations (8)−(12) which they use to deﬁne
the planner’s problem, one can check that the IC binds also at the optimum and that the second best can
be decentralized.
19For a detailed analysis of the role of risk-aversion in principal-agent models of the credit market see
Freixas & Rochet (1997).
20Importantly, we have not restricted in any way participation decisions. That is, our results apply to
the so-called ”delegated” scenario, as well.
21This result can be found in Campioni (2006).
16problem. This is a relevant issue for policy matters and will be a major topic for future
research.
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177 Appendix
To show that our results are robust to the introduction of more general preference struc-
tures for the entrepreneur, in the proofs we will consider the situation in which the en-
trepreneur’s private beneﬁt is represented by the non-linear function B(I), whose prop-
erties have been stated in Section 2. The speciﬁcation B(I) = BI makes the discussion
clearer in the paper and turns out to be unrestrictive.
From now on, we consider a total private beneﬁt function B(I) that is continuous,
increasing and convex in I:
B(0) = 0, B′(I) > 0, B′′(I) ≥ 0,
and such that the Inada conditions hold:
lim
I→0
B′(I) = 0, and lim
I→∞
B′(I) = +∞.
Everything else remaining unchanged, we now characterize the equilibrium allocations
in terms of the incentive function B(.). More precisely, we introduce the sets Bz, Bc and
Bl corresponding to the parameters Bz, Bc and Bl considered in the text.
Deﬁnition 2 We take Bz to be the set of functions B(.) such that:
B (I∗) ≤ pG(I∗) − (1 + r)I∗; (A.1)
Bc to be the set of functions B(.) satisfying:
B (2I∗) ≤ pG(I∗) − (1 + r)I∗; (A.2)
and ﬁnally, we refer to the set Bl as to the set of B(.) such that:
B (I∗ + Im) ≤ pG(Im) − (1 + r)Im. (A.3)
Under our assumptions on B(.), it holds that if B(.) ∈ Bc then B(.) ∈ Bz and B(.) ∈ Bl;
in addition, it is also true that B(.) ∈ Bl implies B(.) ∈ Bz.
We now restate the propositions included in the text as relative to the sets of functions
B(.).
Proposition 4 Whenever B / ∈ Bz, then the outcome (R∗,I∗) can be supported as a (pure
strategy) equilibrium of the game Γ. In particular,
i) Take any B(.) ∈ Bc, then (R∗,I∗) is an equilibrium outcome for any given N;
ii) If B(.) ∈ Bz, and B(.) / ∈ Bc then there exists a critical number of lenders ¯ NB s.t. for
all N > ¯ NB the aggregate allocation (R∗,I∗) is an equilibrium outcome;
iii) For every B(.) ∈ Bl, there exists an equilibrium where only one contract (say, Ci) is
bought. The contract guarantees positive proﬁts to lender i. Furthermore, there is a
second lender (say, lender j) who oﬀers a zero-proﬁt contract that is not accepted.
All other lenders are not active.
18Proof of part i). We consider the following array of oﬀered contracts:
{(Ri,Ii) = (Rj,Ij) = (R∗,I∗) for i  = j; (Rk,Ik) = (0,0) ∀ k  = i,j}.
That is, there are two lenders, say lender i and lender j who oﬀer the ﬁrst-best allocation,
while all other lenders are oﬀering the null contract (0,0). The borrower is indiﬀerent
between accepting the i − th and the j − th contract; given that B(.) ∈ Bc, accepting all
contracts and choosing low action is never a best reply.
In such a scenario, no lender has a proﬁtable deviation given that the ﬁrst-best outcome
is implemented and the borrower’s proﬁt is maximized.
Proof of part ii). Consider the case of B(.) ∈ Bz and B(.) / ∈ Bc. If every lender oﬀers






, it is incentive compatible for the borrower to accept
(N − 1) out of N contracts, provided that the high eﬀort is chosen.
By doing so, the ﬁrst-best aggregate level of investment would be implemented; the bor-
rower would achieve her maximum expected payoﬀ with each single lender getting zero
proﬁts. Let us evaluate if there exist proﬁtable deviations for lenders.
Given what his opponents oﬀer, lender i can never propose a loan that the borrower will
accept and guarantees him positive proﬁts. When all j  = i lenders oﬀer (R′,I′), whatever
lender i proposes, the borrower can always buy the remaining (N−1) contracts and achieve
her maximum payoﬀ. Hence, it is a best response for lender i to oﬀer (R′,I′) when all
other lenders oﬀer (R′,I′).
Finally, to guarantee that the entrepreneur has no proﬁtable deviations, we have to take
















that is, we want that the utility she gets from buying all N contracts and exerting low
action be lower than the ﬁrst-best payoﬀ:






As the function B(.) belongs to the set Bz, then it satisﬁes the condition:
pG(I∗) − I∗(1 + r) ≥ B (I∗). (A.6)
Thus, if N is high enough, condition (A.5) is satisﬁed. Hence, for every B(.) ∈ Bz and
B(.) / ∈ Bc and N high enough, the borrower has no incentive to deviate from buying
(N − 1) contracts and choosing high eﬀort. There does not exist any contract for any
lender i that gives him positive proﬁts and is accepted by the borrower. Hence, (R′,I′)
for each lender, and the borrower accepting (N − 1) contracts and exerting high eﬀort
constitute an equilibrium.
Proof of part iii). Take any B(.) ∈ Bl and consider the function x(I) = pG(I) − I(1 +
r) − B (I + I∗); by continuity there exists an investment level I′ such that x(I′) = 0.
19The equilibrium is deﬁned by:
ˆ one lender, say lender i, oﬀering the contract Ci = (Ii,Ri) with Ii = I∗ and Ri s.t.
pRi = pG(I∗) − I∗(1 + r) − (pG(I′) − I′(1 + r)), hence making positive proﬁts;
ˆ a second lender, say lender j, oﬀering the zero-proﬁt contract Cj = (Ij,Rj) such that
Ij = I′ and pRj = (1 + r)I′;
ˆ all other lenders k ∈ N and k  = i,j oﬀering the null contract Ck = (0,0) and the
borrower accepting Ci, only.
Given the behavior of the other players, lender i must oﬀer the borrower at least a payoﬀ
of pG(I′) − I′(1 + r) in order for his contract to be bought. Hence, he has the incentive
to set the investment level at I∗ so to realize the maximum amount of proﬁts pRi.
Let us now consider lender j: he cannot proﬁtably deviate from the level of investment
Ij = I′ and be guaranteed that his oﬀer is accepted, without inducing the borrower to
shirk to the low action.
Given the existence of the latent contract j, no contract oﬀering positive investment level
proposed by any of the inactive lenders will be accepted at equilibrium.
Finally, the borrower is indiﬀerent between accepting either contract i or j in isolation
and choosing high eﬀort, and buying both contracts and choosing low action. That is,
accepting i only is a best reply.
To complete the characterization of all relevant equilibria, we need to deﬁne the set of
incentive functions related to the implementation of the monopolistic outcome, i.e. Bm.
















pG(I) − (1 + r)I − B(Im + I).
Lemma 3 When B(.) / ∈ Bz, at every (pure strategy) equilibrium of the game Γ the IC
constraint binds.






















where A is the set of accepted contracts.
Notice that equation (A.8) implies that for any given B(.), the aggregate investment is
always lower than corresponding the monopolistic amount:
20 
i∈A
Ii < Im = argmax
I∈
R+
pG(I) − (1 + r)I − B(I). (A.9)
In addition, the argument is not restricting equilibria to be symmetric.
First, take the case A ( N. At the candidate equilibrium there are contracts that are not
accepted, hence lenders earning zero proﬁts. Let the contract oﬀered by lender j be one
of those, i.e. j / ∈ A.
Now, assume lender j deviates, oﬀering Cj = (Rj,Ij), where the deviation is such that:
ˆ lender j makes positive proﬁts;
ˆ the borrower performs the desired level of eﬀort,
ˆ the borrower accepts the new contract together with the contracts contained in A.






























πj = pRj − (1 + r)Ij > 0. (A.11)
We can therefore derive the following expression for pRj:






































> (1 + r), (A.14)
which is always true as long as
 
i∈A Ii < Im and Ij “small enough”. It implies that it
exist a repayment Rj close enough to pG
  







and (11) are satisﬁed.
If the new oﬀer of lender j was such to induce modiﬁcation in the set of accepted contracts
as long as equation (A.8) holds, there always exists a proﬁtable deviation for lender j. For






























πj = pRj − (1 + r)Ij > 0,






























Finally, as Rj and Ij are “small”, the set of accepted contract A′ cannot be the empty set.
Now, consider the case A = N, and let (Ii,Ri)i∈N be the collection of non-null contracts
oﬀered at equilibrium. Clearly, if any of the lenders was oﬀering the null contract, i.e.
























then any of the N lenders would have a proﬁtable deviation: he could raise the repayment
of his contract until (A.17) binds.
Proposition 5 If B(.) / ∈ Bz, then no allocation guaranteeing zero proﬁts to the lenders
can be sustained at equilibrium. In addition,
iv) If B(.) ∈ Bm, then there is a critical number of lenders NB such that for every
N ≥ NB, there exists a positive proﬁt equilibrium. The equilibrium outcome
 
N ˜ R,N ˜ I
 
is













(N − 1)˜ I
 
















and exhibits the feature that:
(N − 1)˜ I > Im (A.20)
v) If B(.) / ∈ Bm, then the monopoly outcome can be supported at equilibrium for any
given N.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that B(.) / ∈ Bz and that there exists a zero-proﬁt
equilibrium. At equilibrium, it should be
 
i
Ii ≤ ¯ I(B), otherwise the borrower will strictly
prefer to accept all loans and shirk.22 Now, there must be at least two lenders oﬀering a
positive loan amount, otherwise monopoly would be implemented breaking the conjectured
zero-proﬁt equilibrium. Let us call these lenders i and j and let Ii > 0 and Ij > 0 be the
respective amount of loan each of them oﬀers.
22Paralleling the discussion in the text, we take ¯ I(B) to be the credit level that guarantees the full
appropriation of surplus by the borrower, given the incentive structure B.
22It must be that: ¯ I − Ij ≥ Ii > 0, and since we conjectured a zero-proﬁt equilibrium with
two strictly positive contractual oﬀers: pG(Ij) − (1 + r)Ij > B(Ij).
Hence, there should exist an ǫ > 0 such that:
pG(Ij + ǫ) − (1 + r)(Ij + ǫ) > B(Ij + ǫ)
Given we are in the increasing part of the surplus function,
pG(Ij + ǫ) − (1 + r)(Ij + ǫ) > pG(Ij) + (1 + r)Ij.
But then, there exists a δ > 0 such that:
pG(Ij + ǫ) − (1 + r)(Ij + ǫ) − δ > max{pG(Ij) + (1 + r)Ij,B(Ij + ǫ)}.
That is, there exists a proﬁtable deviation for lender i when oﬀering (ǫ,δ).
Proof of part iv). The proof is organized in two steps. First, we show that there is an
aggregate contract
 
N ˜ R,N ˜ I
 
which is a solution of the system (A.18)-(A.19) and satisﬁes
(A.20). In a next step we show that the strategy proﬁle (Ri,Ii) =
 
˜ R, ˜ I
 
for every lender
i ∈ N together with the borrower decision of accepting all contracts and choosing the high
level eﬀort is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
























We deﬁne f (I) = p
 














, where ¯ I(B)







− (1 + r) ¯ I(B) = 0
and Im represents the monopolistic level of investment corresponding to the relevant B(.) ∈
Bm. It is easy to check that ¯ I(B) > Im. Now, let us denote ¯ I(B)o =
¯ I(B)
N . Evaluating the
function f (I) at ¯ I(B)o, we obtain:
f














Given that the function G(.) is concave and recalling that pG′  ¯ I(B)
 














 ¯ I(B)o 
< 0.
Using a similar argument, and recalling the deﬁnition of Bm we can check that for every












Given ˜ I, the value of R satisfying (A.18)-(A.19) can hence be deﬁned in a direct way.
Now, we have to show that at equilibrium every lender will oﬀer the contract
 
˜ R, ˜ I
 
and
that the borrower will always have an incentive to accept all contracts and to select the
high action.
Let us start with the borrower’s behavior: if each lender is playing ( ˜ R, ˜ I), then the bor-
rower’s strategy of accepting N contracts and exerting high eﬀort is a best reply. Equations
(A.18) and (A.19) guarantee that when
 
N ˜ R,N ˜ I
 
is oﬀered in the aggregate, then the
borrower cannot deviate by accepting (N − 1) contracts. No reductions in the number of
accepted contracts will be proﬁtable.
Let us consider now the behavior of the lenders. Suppose all (N −1) lenders except lender
i oﬀer
 
˜ R, ˜ I
 
and consider lender i’s best response. Assume lender i oﬀers (Ri,Ii), his
best payoﬀ can be measured with respect to the aggregate amount of loans the borrower
takes up:
πi = pRi − (1 + r)Ii =
= pG
 
k˜ I + Ii
 





(N − 1)˜ I
 
− p(N − 1) ˜ R,B
 




where πi is lender i’s payoﬀ as a function of (Ri,Ii) and k = {0,1,2,...,N − 1} is the
number of contracts the borrower buys together with the i-th. On the right hand side
of equation (A.25) we represented the surplus at the aggregate amount of investment  
k˜ I + Ii
 
net of the reimbursements of the k lenders oﬀering
 
˜ R, ˜ I
 
and of the borrower’s
utility. The borrower’s payoﬀ cannot fall below the minimum between the amount she
obtains accepting the (N − 1) contracts and exerting high eﬀort, i.e. pG
 
(N − 1)˜ I
 
−
p(N − 1) ˜ R, and the utility from shirking, i.e. B
 
(N − 1)˜ I + Ii
 
.
We remark that using equations (A.18) and (A.19), the repayment of each of the (N −1)
lenders is given by:








(N − 1)˜ I
  
. (A.26)
Now, let us examine the choice of Ii by the i-th principal.
There can be two cases: either Ii ≤ ˜ I or Ii > ˜ I.
In the ﬁrst case, from the deﬁnition of the equilibrium the borrower will have to be
guaranteed at least pG
 
(N − 1)˜ I
 
− p(N − 1) ˜ R that is greater then B
 
(N − 1)˜ I + Ii
 
for every Ii ≤ ˜ I.
In addition, given Ii ≤ ˜ I and the concavity of G(.), the borrower will buy all the (N − 1)
contracts together with the i-th. When choosing Ii the lender anticipates how his proposal
aﬀects the entrepreneur’s choice on the number of contracts k she purchases from the
opponents. We show that for every Ii ≤ ˜ I, the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ is in fact increasing
24in k up to k = N − 1. Take the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ in the case she buys k˜ I + Ii and
compare it with buying (N − 1)˜ I + Ii, it’s easy to see that: ∀k = 0,1,...,N − 2
pG
 
(N − 1)˜ I + Ii
 
− p(N − 1) ˜ R − pRi > pG
 
k˜ I + Ii
 
− pk ˜ R − pRi (A.27)
Hence, the borrower tries to implement an aggregate loan amount of (N − 1)˜ I or N ˜ I.
This remains true even in the case when Ii > ˜ I. If lender i chooses to oﬀer Ii > ˜ I and the
number of lenders N is suﬃciently high, the concavity of G(.) implies that the borrower




k˜ I + Ii
 
≈




(N − 1)˜ I
 
(A.28)
Any increase in Ii must hence be accompanied by a reduction in k. Conditional on choosing
high eﬀort, the previous discussion completely characterizes the borrower’s choice of k, i.e.
her best reply in terms of the number of accepted contracts.23
We remark that whenever Ii > ˜ I, implementing high eﬀort and choosing the associated k
contracts together with Ii is always dominated by accepting all oﬀers and shirking. That
is, for every Ii > ˜ I we have:
B
 




k˜ I + Ii
 
− pRi − kp ˜ R (A.29)
To show that the inequality (A.29) holds for every possible choice of Ii, consider that
the i-th lender must earn at least what he could earn oﬀering the contract (˜ I, ˜ R), i.e.
pRi−(1+r)Ii ≥ p ˜ R−(1+r)˜ I. Let us take the most favorable case for the borrower, that
is pRi − (1 + r)Ii = p ˜ R − (1 + r)˜ I. In addition, according to equation (A.28), the choice
of k satisﬁes k˜ I = (N − 1)˜ I − Ii. We can therefore rewrite the inequality (A.29) as:
B
 












p ˜ R (A.30)






(N − 1)˜ I
 
− (N − 1)p ˜ R,
equation (A.30) can hence be rewritten as:
B
 











B((N − 1)˜ I + Ii) − B(N ˜ I)
Ii − ˜ I
(Ii − ˜ I) >
 
pG(N ˜ I) − pG((N − 1)˜ I)
˜ I
− (1 + r)
 
(Ii − ˜ I)
23Notice that whenever Ii > ˜ I the best reply of the borrower is multivalued. She is indiﬀerent between
buying the i-th contract together with k < N − 1 non-deviating ones, and rejecting the oﬀer Ii and
accepting all other oﬀers.





+ (1 + r) > pG′(N ˜ I). (A.32)
For every Ii > ˜ I equation (A.32) is true, since (N − 1)˜ I > Im. Therefore, whenever the
i-th lender tries to oﬀer a higher amount of loans Ii > ˜ I he cannot prevent shirking.
None of the lenders can proﬁtably deviate from the oﬀer (˜ I, ˜ R).
Proof of part v). We want to prove that, at equilibrium, there is one lender, say lender
i, oﬀering Ci = (Im,Rm) while the remaining N − 1 lenders are oﬀering (0,0). For lender
i, Ci is clearly a best response, since he attains the maximum available proﬁt.
Let us consider if there exist proﬁtable deviations for any of the non-active N −1 lenders,
say lender j. To have a proﬁtable deviation, lender j should be able to oﬀer some pos-
itive amount of loan Ij > 0 and having his contract accepted either together with the
incumbent’s loan Im or in competition with him.
If Ij is bought together with Im, then the proﬁt the deviating lender could get is given by:
πj = pG(Im + Ij) − (1 + r)Ij − pRm − B(Im + Ij), (A.33)
where pRm = pG(Im) − B(Im) from the maximization problem of a monopolist. We can
rewrite equation (A.33) as:
πj = pG(Im + Ij) − pG(Im) − (1 + r)Ij − [B(Im + Ij) − B(Im)]. (A.34)
The concavity of G(.) and the convexity of B(.) imply that:
πj < pG′(Im)Ij − (1 + r)Ij − B(Im + Ij) + B(Im)
< pG′(Im)Ij − (1 + r)Ij − B′(Im)Ij
= 0
Hence, lender j cannot proﬁtably oﬀer a loan that is taken up together with the i-th and
gives him positive proﬁts. In case lender j tries to compete with the incumbent, the best
he can earn is given by:
πj = pG(Ij) − (1 + r)Ij − B(Im + Ij). (A.35)
Now, the best lender j can do is to oﬀer the amount of investment that solves: pG′(Ij) =
(1+r)+B′(Im+Ij). But, given that B(.) / ∈ Bm, by doing so the entrepreneur will always
strictly prefer to buy both contracts and shirk. As a consequence, lender j does not have
any proﬁtable deviation from oﬀering (0,0).
Let us move now to the welfare properties of market equilibria. The features of constrained
Pareto optimal allocations derived in Section 4 naturally extend to a scenario where private
26beneﬁts are a non-linear function of the borrowed amount I. First, it is possible to show
that the convexity of the B(I) function preserves the concavity of the Pareto frontier:
Lemma 4 For every π∗∗
b ≤ B (I∗) the second-best Pareto frontier π∗∗
L (π∗∗
b ,B) is a concave
curve. In particular, π∗∗
L (π∗∗
b ,B) has a maximum in π∗∗




b ,B) is monotonically increasing.
Proof. If π∗∗
b ≤ B (I∗) is not binding, we are back to the linear part of the frontier,
which is trivially concave. The interesting case is that of a binding incentive compatibility
constraint, i.e. π∗∗
b = B (I∗). Given π∗∗
b and B, then I is uniquely determined and given
by I = B−1 (π∗∗
b ). As a consequence, we get:
π∗∗
L (π∗∗





− (1 + r)B−1 (π∗∗
b ) − π∗∗
b (A.36)











b ) − (1 + r)B−1 ′ (π∗∗


















b )−(1+r)B−1 ′′ (π∗∗
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 2 ≤ 0. Hence, π∗∗
L (π∗∗
b )
is a concave function of π∗∗
b .
Eventually, we argue that the equilibrium outcomes characterized through Proposition
4 and Proposition 5 identify (constrained) eﬃcient allocations. Importantly, all these
equilibria are such that the relevant (IC) constraint turns out to be binding. One can in
fact show the following:
Proposition 6 All the (pure strategies) equilibrium outcomes deﬁned in Proposition 4




Proof. Let us start with Proposition 4.
The equilibria characterized in parts i) and ii) are competitive equilibria, where lenders
earn zero-proﬁt and the entrepreneur appropriates all the surplus. In addition the aggre-
gate amount of investment is the ﬁrst-best one, I∗. Hence, they correspond to point A in
Figure 3 in the text. These equilibria belong to the linear part of the second-best frontier,
in fact they are also ﬁrst-best equilibria.
In part iii) of Proposition 4 we characterize equilibria with latent contracts in the region
B ∈ Bz. These equilibria guarantee positive proﬁts to the active lender and zero-proﬁt to
the non-active one with an aggregate investment level still equal to I∗.
27Recall that when B ∈ Bz it is possible to sustain the ﬁrst-best level of investment I∗
together with π∗∗
b > B(I∗). This is the case of a latent-contract equilibrium, with the
expected utility for the entrepreneur given by:
pG(I′) − (1 + r)I′ = B(I∗ + I′)
This keeps the latent lender out of the market. The equilibrium level of investment is
the same that a social planner would choose when solving (9)-(10) with a slack incentive
compatibility constraint. In fact, this equilibrium allocation corresponds to a point on
the constrained Pareto frontier where the ﬁrst-best level of investment I∗ is implemented,
and:
π∗∗
b = B(I∗ + I′) > B(I∗) (A.37)
π∗∗
L (π∗∗
b ,B) = pG(I∗) − (1 + r)I∗ − B(I∗ + I′) (A.38)
The latent contracts are a device for a diﬀerent sharing of the surplus among the con-
tractual parties. Such equilibrium allocations correspond to points on the linear part of a
second-best Pareto frontier π∗∗
L (π∗∗
b ,B) like the one depicted in Figure 3. They belong to
the ﬁrst-best set of outcomes, too.
Let us now move to Proposition 5.
To discuss part iv) let us ﬁrst introduce a useful deﬁnition. Assume that the borrower
earns ˜ πb in the positive-proﬁts equilibrium, we denote ˜ πL (˜ πb) the lenders’ payoﬀ induced
by ˜ πb at equilibrium.
Let us now take π∗∗
b = ˜ πb and construct the equilibrium relationship ˜ πL (˜ πb). In the
positive-proﬁts equilibrium deﬁned by (A.18)-(A.20) each lender oﬀers the same contract
(˜ I, ˜ R) and in the aggregate the borrower buys all contracts and exerts high eﬀort. The
borrower is indiﬀerent between accepting N or (N−1) contracts. Let us call IA the amount
of credit issued and pRA the expected revenues of the lenders. Given that the Incentive
Compatibility constraint is binding in this equilibrium, we then have π∗∗
b = ˜ πb = B(N ˜ I),
that implies:
IA = B−1 (˜ πb) = B−1 (π∗∗
b ) (A.39)
where we denoted IA = N ˜ I.
Given the borrower payoﬀ ˜ πb, the aggregate investment level IA that supports ˜ πb at equi-
librium is uniquely determined. In particular, the Incentive Compatibility constraint of
the equilibrium deﬁnes the same level of aggregate investment of the second-best problem.
This investment level IA determines the aggregate surplus of the economy as:
SA = pG(IA) − (1 + r)IA (A.40)












28Notice that the payoﬀ the credit sector earns is strictly positive:
π∗∗
L (π∗∗
b ) = pRA − (1 + r)IA > 0 (A.42)
In particular, the system of equations (A.39)-(A.41) identiﬁes a pair (π∗∗
L ,π∗∗
b ) belonging
to the frontier of the constrained utility possibility set F′ (πb,πL).
Eventually, part v) of Proposition 5 discusses monopolistic equilibria for the region of
B / ∈ Bz. Recall that for the incentive structures under consideration, the ﬁrst-best level
of investment is not feasible. At the monopoly, the incentive compatibility constraint is
binding and the lender gets his maximum payoﬀ. Hence, the utility for the entrepreneur
is given by:
p(G(Im) − Rm) = B(Im) (A.43)
and the monopolist’s payoﬀ by:
πm = pG(Im) − B(Im) − (1 + r)Im (A.44)
In the utility space, these payoﬀs correspond to maximum of the second-best Pareto fron-
tier, as depicted in Figure 3 and Figure 4 in the text.
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